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Abstract 
Understanding why members leave or remain in groups has received little attention despite 
its fundamental importance for organizational maintenance. In this analysis, a theory of experiential 
search is proposed and applied to Common Cause. Group participation is conceptualized as a 
process by which imperfectly informed decision-makers learn about the organizations they join. 
This framework makes quitting understandable and provides a link between the initial membership 
choice and follow-up decisions. 
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The Essentials of Organizational Maintenance 
Organizational maintenance is a fact of life all group leaders confront. For the majority of 
interest group entrepreneurs, who depend on constituent dues as a prime funding source, 
maintenance dictates the need to keep members contributing (but see Walker 1983).1 Even
seemingly small drops in numbers-10 or 20 percent net of replacements-are viewed with great 
alarm; and the loss of long-time contributors is perceived as a threat to the entity's survival. The key 
to creating a successful organization can be summarized simply: Entice potential members to join, 
keep attrition below the rate at which replacements can be found, and establish a core membership. 
If this prescription is correct, it is curious that analysts of interest group membership focus 
almost exclusively on first-time joiners.2 Most authors deal only implicitly with the dynamics 
underlying the retention choice, that is, the decision by existing members to remain in the group and 
continue to contribute.3 Attracting members is fundamental for long-term organizational prosperity, 
but signing them up in the first place is only half the battle. The conditional joining decisions on 
whether to stay in the organization are also crucial. 
Interest group entrepreneurs encounter a dilemma: how to keep valued members for whom 
leaving may be an attractive option.4 The leaders focus on producing the selective incentives that 
the membership wants. They also evidence preoccupation with not antagonizing constituents in 
ways that will lead them to cease contributing. They operate and structure the interest group so as to 
facilitate contributions (Moe 1980). How else, for example, can one explain the elaborate lengths to 
which many leaders will go to ensure the appearance of rank-and-file participation in the 
organizational decision-making process? 
In the political arena, the retention problem should hit home hardest for public interest 
groups. Their leaders lack the occupational or industry bases that underlie so many private 
associations. They cannot draw on a "natural" membership, among whom either selective incentives 
are easily generated or coercion induces contributions. That people sign up in the first place in light 
of the collective action dilemma, no less retain their organizational allegiance, is a phenomenon that 
has generated considerable scholarly interest (Berry 1977, Smith 1985). 
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Why, then, do members of an organization, especially a public interest group, choose to 
remain? Is this process indistinguishable from the original decision to join an organization­
whatever that may be? How are the two connected, if at all? 
These issues will be explored by analyzing what is popularly considered the quintessential 
public interest group: Common Cause. In the fall of 1981, over 1,200 Common Cause members 
were surveyed using a mail questionnaire. A stratified design oversampled Common Cause­
designated activists, who were defined as steering committee coordinators in a congressional district 
or coordinators or activators of telephone networks. They comprise 23 percent of the sample, a 
roughly seven-fold overrepresentation.5 All respondents were queried about a wide variety of
issues--membership and its benefits, personal attitudes, previous history in Common Cause, and 
future intentions, to name a few. These data furnish a rare opportunity to explore the retention 
decision and to learn about why people participate in political organizations despite all the obstacles 
to collective action. 
The first part of this analysis lays out the theoretical groundwork by specifying alternative 
conceptualizations of the membership renewal process.6 Despite frequent assertions in the literature
that the study of organizational membership is theory rich and data poor, it is argued here that the 
available models require further development. Once the proper theoretical underpinnings have been 
laid, the focus shifts to the empirical world. Unlike prior descriptive work on the original 
membership decision by authors who eschew hypothesis testing, competing retention models are 
operationalized and tested to determine whether it is possible to make sense of members' decisions 
to stay in or leave organizations. 
Theoretical Perspectives: Joining, Remaining, and Experiential Search 
Although this study looks primarily at renewal decisions, the initial reason for joining is the 
logical place to start. In the first place, virtually all of the available theoretical research focuses on 
the original membership calculus. Second, an analysis of the initial choice furnishes a vantage point 
from which to consider the renewal decision, and vice versa. The challenge is to integrate 
perspectives on both initial contributions and retention decisions. 
In the mid-1960s, Mancur Olson (1965) revolutionized perceptions about why citizens join 
organized groups. His seminal contribution details the difficulties associated with collective action. 
Individuals join large groups, he argues, because the value of the available selective benefits exceeds 
the costs of membership. Selective benefits are those tangible rewards derived from contributing that 
have monetary values. They either may be divisible, private rewards or may emanate from 
members' impact on the levels of collective goods provided to everyone. 
Olson assumes that individuals have full information, are only interested in economic 
rewards, and maximize without error. Political activity is simply a by-product of narrowly self­
interested behavior. 
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Given this framework, it is obvious that the conditional membership decision should follow 
the same cost-benefit analysis. Since in general not much will change from one contribution period 
to the next, particularly given the assumption of perfect information, little explicable organizational 
attrition is possible. This membership decision may be written as follows: 
(R IM) = f (S, D )  
where R I M  is the retention decision conditioned upon membership, 
S is divisible selective benefits, and D is the dues level. 
Those challenging Olson's theory have taken two principal tacts. Some (e.g., Oark & 
Wilson 1961, Wilson 1973, Moe 1980) emphasize that purposive and solidary incentives are 
important, along with selective returns, in the decision calculus. Solidary benefits stem from 
associational interactions, while purposive benefits are intangible rewards garnered from 
contributing to the group because of its stated goals. 
(1) 
Individuals who possess perfect information but are not satisfied by selective incentives 
alone may join because the potential purposive and solidary payoffs push them over the threshold 
where benefits exceed costs. People derive consumption benefits from interpersonal interactions and 
the purposive statements their contributions make. The multiplicity of incentives can be easily 
incorporated into the Olsonian framework, and the same caveats about the conditional membership 
decision still hold: 
(R IM) = f (S, D ,  P ,I,) 
where P refers to purposive returns and I , to solidary returns, 
which are gained through interactions. 
This argument is intuitively reasonable; Olson himself recognizes the potential of nonmonetary 
returns but ignores them for reasons of parsimony. 
(2) 
Another critique is that the key problem lies less with the breadth of incentives than with the 
assumption of perfect information. Moe (1980) maintains that potential group members possess 
imperfect information and are boundedly rational. Consequently, some decision-makers 
miscalculate their own contributions to the provision of collective goods and hence the level of 
selective incentives the group offers: 
E(R IM) = f (S , D , P  ,l, C )  
where C constitutes the expected return from changes in the level o f  collective 
goods provided. 
(3) 
A subset of the population mistakenly think of themselves as highly influential and incorporate their 
allegedly substantial contributions to the provision of collective goods into their membership calculi. 
Individuals whose perceptions of their efficacy put them at the upper end of the population 
distribution join in disproportionate numbers. The assumption seems to be that once these 
contributors miscalculate, they keep making the same mistake over and over. Again, organizational 
membership ought to be stable, and there should be little explicable attrition. 
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The relaxation of the perfect infonnation assumption is eminently reasonable and extremely 
important. But precisely how imperfect infonnation affects contributions needs to be rethought. It 
ought to influence more than simply individuals' initial estimates of the benefits they derive from 
contributing to collective goods.7 The conclusion that many members join organizations only
because they make mistakes is unsettling-especially because educated individuals tend to join in 
greater proportions. Implying that those committing errors keep contributing for years without 
revising their prior beliefs is even more difficult to believe. As in the two models elaborated above, 
the conditional membership decision replicates the initial choice to join. While there may be some 
exogenous forces prompting a few individuals to leave, the outcomes generally ought to be the same 
under all three models. 
A more reasonable supposition is that the decision to join makes sense as a strategy by 
individuals who recognize their lack of knowledge. Members join groups to learn about them, and 
as they acquire knowledge, some can be expected to leave. The politics of experiential search offer 
a superior perspective for understanding retention and integrating it with the initial membership 
choice.8
A Theory of Experiential Search 
Organizational membership can be conceptualized as a search process. Citizens lack 
complete infonnation about all of the alternative groups they might join and the associated costs and 
benefits. They presumably would like to discover organization(s) that will give them enough returns 
relative to costs-regardless of the types of benefits they seek-that they will be content to remain. 
In looking for an organization to fill their needs, individual decision-makers have three 
options: (1) They can conclude that given the problems of obtaining infonnation and the costs of 
membership, it is advisable to give up. (2) They can search over alternative associations without 
contributing. (3) They can join an organization to learn whether membership is worthwhile. This 
final option, learning through exposure, can have a number of facets: developing an understanding 
about how a group functions, about whether it is effective in achieving its goals, and whether its 
outputs are in line with one's preferences, to name a few. Given the low monetary cost of joining 
numerous voluntary associations-particularly public interest groups-many should opt for 
experiential learning because it is an efficient infonnation-gathering technique.9
A factor predisposing searchers to join an organization is that many attributes of 
membership are only observable by participation. These are specific characteristics, while those 
observed directly are general characteristics. These two types can be thought of as opposite poles on 
a continuum that reflects the difficulty of acquiring infonnation without making a commitment; most 
infonnational traits combine elements of both. 
Almost every factor incorporated into the joining (or retention) calculus can be described, at 
least partially, as a specific characteristic. The only purely general feature of organizational 
membership is the dues level. If the remaining factors were ranked from more to less general, they 
might roughly be ranked as follows: costs other than dues levels, purposive benefits, divisible 
benefits, solidary benefits, and collective benefits. 
5 
When the costs of evaluating specific qualities are relatively low, prospective contributors 
will tend, ceteris paribus, to join, accumulate knowledge, and then decide either to quit or to stay 
and learn more. Since a reasonable inference is that one accumulates knowledge more and more 
slowly over time, the expected rate of dropping out should diminish temporally. Specific 
characteristics should also be more important for newcomers than for veterans. 
First-time joiners will have imperfect information about costs other than dues. How can the 
costs of phone calls asking for assistance-writing legislators, contacting other members, etc.--or 
appeals for monetary contributions in excess of dues be established without error ex ante? As 
contributors spend time in the group, they will develop a growing awareness of the true price of 
membership and behave accordingly. 
Along these same lines, the value of purposive benefits will be increasingly evident with 
experience. Although members will probably have some initial idea about what the group stands for, 
they will gradually learn whether it represents those things that provide them with consumption 
benefits. 
Before they join, potential members will also lack complete information about the quality of 
the divisible benefits furnished to participants. Accurately assessing the full value of a groups' 
offerings without consuming them regularly is all but impossible; membership offers an opportunity 
to learn about their utility gradually. 
This inference has an important implication: Suppose that before engaging in experiential 
search, small contributors deduce that their donations will have no impact on the level of collective 
goods provided. Presume too that purposive and solidary incentives play no role in eliciting 
contributions. Even in this extreme case where lack of knowledge is irrelevant for an individuals ' 
valuation of collective, purposive, or solidary benefits, imperfect information still ought to be a 
major factor in members' decision calculi. 
If contributors are motivated by solidary returns, it is unlikely that they will have a full idea 
of the value of these benefits either. Only immersion in day-to-day organizational operations will 
permit them to see whether the interpersonal interactions are sufficiently rewarding. 
Experiential search should be especially germane for learning about collective goods. 
Member education should have several elements. Contributors ought to become more cognizant of 
what collective benefits their organization actually proffers. Furthermore, those who believe that 
their contributions to the provision of collective goods are nontrivial should learn about the value of 
these goods and the insignificance of their contributions. Members who donate resources to have an 
impact on the magnitude of public goods provided-and not because they gain purposive rewards 
from contributing to collective goods-should leave the group over time, ceteris paribus. 
To reiterate: citizens with perfect information (or those who have imperfect information but 
never learn) will join those organizations that have the highest net benefits for them. While changes 
in exogenous conditions might lead some to exit, the strong presumption is that once a participant, 
always a participant.10 But when the assumption of imperfect information is embedded within the 
experiential search framework, quitting becomes comprehensible. 
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Group membership might usefully be conceptualized as a decision process in which 
members join an organization and then reevaluate their decision (see also Figure 1): 
E(R IM) =f (S , D ,P ,I , C  ,L) 
where L is the expected impact of learning. 
(4) 
Each membership renewal period is another stage in this decision process; and each time, the 
contributor has better infonnation. Learning about specific characteristics continues indefinitely, but 
the amount of additional infonnation accumulated through experiential search diminishes over time. 
Members weed themselves out, especially during their first few years in an organization. 
Information updating can reinforce a propensity to remain in the group for another contribution 
period or lead to the conclusion that membership is less valuable than foregone opportunities. Those 
abdicating membership either become politically inactive or continue searching for an alternative 
that makes participation worthwhile. For those who stay in the organization, over time learning 
should become a less and less salient factor in the decision whether to stay or go. 
(Figure 1 about here) 
Experiential Search Theory: An Empirical Test 
The experiential search theory implies that withdrawal is a rational response by imperfectly 
infonned decision-makers. Unlike the previous three models, under this fonnulation members' 
cost/benefit calculations should change substantially over time. This expectation has three 
implications that can be tested with cross-sectional data on Common Cause membership:11 (1) a
model of the conditional membership decision should uncover fairly strong relationships between 
costs and benefits, even for those individuals who have previously elected to join; (2) the longer 
contributors have been in the organization, the less likely they ought to be to leave, because the 
likely increment in knowledge declines over time; and (3) the impact of those factors that guide the 
retention calculus, particularly very specific characteristics, ought to be stronger for relative 
newcomers. 
The true test of this framework is how well these theoretical assertions explain behavior in 
the empirical world. Too often students of organizational membership have been content to utilize a 
few descriptive tables-largely because they were analyzing the initial membership decision with 
data only about members. This research focuses on testable hypotheses about membership 
dynamics. 
The empirical analysis of Common Cause renewal decisions unfolds in four steps. First, to 
provide the proper context, the costs and benefits of contributing to the association are outlined. 
Second, descriptive data about the reasons members say they initially joined are provided to 
establish a baseline for comparison with their subsequent decisions. Third, whether those who 
belong to an organization learn over time is examined to provide side-evidence about the assertions 
made earlier. Finally, models of the conditional membership process are operationalized and 
directly tested to determine which is most empirically valid. 
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The Costs and Benefits of Common Cause Membership 
Common Cause is the most prominent of the new wave of organizations associated with the 
burgeoning consumer movement (for a detailed case study, see McFarland 1984). This alone makes 
it a natural candidate for study. But it is the leadership's strong dependence on its more than 
200,000 members that makes it especially appealing for analysis. The members are essential both 
for their financial contributions and for their activism at key points during the organization's external 
political battles. What, then, are the costs and benefits that motivate citizens to contribute to 
Common Cause? 
Initially joining the association is a reasonably low-cost activity. Organizational dues are 
predictably moderate: 20 dollars per year. Members are fairly well-off-their median family 
income in 1981 fell in the 25,000-35,000 dollar range, about 50 percent higher than the national 
average.12 A tenable assumption is that relatively well-heeled contributors can learn about Common
Cause or other moderately priced organizations through experiential search. 
These members should discover new information about the value of belonging. They learn 
that there are additional costs to participation. Members are solicited to give more financial support, 
and many comply. In fact, 63 percent of those surveyed report contributing more than the required 
20 dollars. Despite this generosity, Common Cause, with a staff of less than one hundred, lacks the 
financial resources to compete on an even footing with private interest groups. It-like public 
interest associations generally-employs other instruments to make up for these shortfalls. One 
critical resource is energizing contributors to become politically involved. Members are asked to 
give of their time and become part of Common Cause's activist core. They are encouraged to 
immerse themselves in the association's sophisticated, congressionally based, grassroots network, as 
well as in state and local organizations. 
It is difficult to be simply a passive contributor. Those preferring only to write checks will 
find themselves the targets of periodic mobilization efforts when battles over issues pinpointed by 
the leadership come to a head. Forty-three percent of all members in the survey (32 percent of the 
rank-and-file and 68 percent of the activists) said they had been contacted by Common Cause in the 
past year and asked to write to Congress about some issue. 13
Contributors also have opportunities to learn about the complete gamut of organizational 
benefits. Although the stereotypical individual who joins Common Cause is characterized as a 
liberal do-gooder, the leadership obviously believes that divisible benefits are necessary to keep 
members happy. A bimonthly magazine is distributed to association members as an enticement to 
contribute; perhaps the consumption of this and the other political information furnished is sufficient 
to elicit a minimal annual contribution. 14
Some may perceive another private return from participation, namely, career advancement. 
Suggesting self-promotion as a motivation is antithetical to the high moral ground that Common 
Cause tries to occupy, but it is consistent with the by-product theory. An unexpectedly high 
proportion of respondents-23 percent-replied that they have political aspirations. Thirty-five 
percent of those surveyed stated that they either have political aspirations or had sometime sought a 
party position, elected office, or appointed office. When broken down between rank-and-file and 
activists, the percentages are 32 and 45, respectively. This discovery suggests that the participation 
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of many allegedly altruistic liberals may be motivated by the search for a springboard onto the 
political opportunity structure (Schlesinger 1966), or perhaps by a desire to be educated about liberal 
positions. If it does the trick, membership is renewed; if not, the aspirant moves on and continues to 
search. 
Common Cause has been involved in many celebrated battles, generally associated with 
"good government" issues designed to provide a host of nonexclusive collective goods. The 
leadership selects its policy areas carefully to maintain membership loyalty. To gather information 
about constituent preferences, the staff annually polls contributors for their opinions about the 
Common Cause political agenda. Choosing those issues over which opinions are particularly 
homogeneous is considered especially important (McFarland 1984). 
This decision-making strategy has several interesting implications. It implies a belief that 
members either think they have an impact on the provision of collective goods or get considerable 
value from the purposive statement that their participation in Common Cause makes to the world. 
Assuming that the leadership's inference is correct, this conflict-minimizing strategy should also 
mitigate the impact on retention decisions of members' satisfaction or dissatisfaction over the 
association's political actions. If those in charge selected issues exclusively on other criteria, e.g., if 
they mistakenly viewed political action as a by-product that has no weight in participants' decision 
calculi, then contributors' evaluations of Common Cause's political efforts would be more germane 
in conditional membership decisions. 
Common Cause's decentralized structure obviously provides ample opportunities for 
interpersonal interactions (see also McFarland 1984). Although much of this is a product of 
organizational weakness--lack of funds forces the staff to rely heavily upon its other major resource, 
an energetic membership--it may also be a strength when it comes to keeping contributors in the 
organization. 
Why Join in the First Place? A Brief Note 
Information on members' professed reasons for joining Common Cause cannot explain why 
people belong. However, it does furnish a vantage point from which the retention process can be 
understood. Are participants' reasons for staying or leaving consistent with their assessments of why 
they initially contributed? Or do other unrelated factors enter their calculations? 
Using an open-ended format, members were asked why they joined. Their responses were 
coded according to the type of benefits they seemed to value most. The most intriguing result is that 
the vast majority of contributors believe that they got involved for purposive reasons (Table 1). 
Even employing an extraordinarily broad definition of selective benefits, 72 percent of respondents 
must be classified as professing that purposive concerns stimulated them to sign up.15 These data are
consistent with the experiential search argument that members know little about the specific costs 
and benefits of belonging when they initially join. General reformist tendencies were especially 
evident among those with a purposive impetus. Even many whose initial participation allegedly 
reflects the quest for selective benefits exhibit a broad participatory impulse. They claim they chose 
Common Cause to be politically effective or mobilized and generally not because of specific issues 
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or other detailed benefits. 
(Table 1 about here) 
Do Members Learn? 
An assumption underpinning the experiential search framework is that members learn about 
the costs and benefits of participating. More extensive knowledge about these organizational 
features can lead to higher or lower levels of retention. But regardless of whether members stay or 
leave, learning is a fundamental component of experiential search.16 A prerequisite for validating
this perspective is ascertaining whether contributors learn through organizational exposure.17 In 
Common Cause, individuals with many years of associational experience are no different 
sociodemographically than newcomers. They are indistinguishable in terms of education or income, 
so any variation must emanate from other sources. Findings that long-term contributors know more 
would demonstrate that members learn and would provide important side-evidence that experiential 
search is fundamental for associational membership. 
Several straightforward tests clearly show that new arrivals and long-time contributors are 
only distinguishable as a result of their organizational exposure. Members answered a battery of 
four basic questions about their organizational acumen. 18 When respondents' knowledge is broken
out by length of membership, the experiential search perspective receives strong support. Long-time 
contributors know a great deal more than newcomers (Table 2). Roughly one-third of the one- or 
two-year members missed all four of these questions; the same is true of less than five percent of the 
members who have been in the group for more than ten years. 
(Table 2 about here) 
Also, as expected, the mean level of knowledge for each cohort shows a clear pattern of 
diminishing marginal returns with organizational experience. A year has roughly four times as much 
impact for newcomers as for long-time members. 
Next, consider knowledge about the collective goods that Common Cause furnishes. 
Members were asked about associational positions on five issues on the group's political agenda. In 
four out of five instances, new members are substantially more likely to reply that they did not know 
the Common Cause position on these policies (Table 3a). 19 But when queried about their own
positions on either these issues or other items not on the Common Cause agenda, differences 
between older and newer members are nonexistent, with one slight exception (Table 3b). 
(Tables 3a and 3b about here) 
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While recent members are as opinionated about the public agenda as long-time contributors, 
they are less well-versed in the organization's stances. A substantial portion of new members could 
not have been motivated to join the group by its overall issue positions, since they did not know 
them. This finding supports the belief that general, largely purposive benefits, rather than returns 
from specific collective goods, are at the heart of the initial joining decision. 
The learning process is also apparently fundamental for the leap from rank-and-file to 
activist status. Stated bluntly, activists are made, not born. Modal activists have been in the 
organization for three years when they move up from the rank-and-file; a scant 10 percent of all 
members are activists from the start. 20 This behavior is consistent with a search framework.
Imperfectly informed individuals join the organization, learn about it, and decide what their next 
step is-whether to drop out, remain in the rank-and-file, or step up to the activist cadre. 
The learning process provides initial side-evidence that experiential search is a fundamental 
component of organizational membership. Contributors write checks and then decide what they 
really think about the organization. 
Exploring the Conditional Membership Process 
Quitting is an important consequence of experiential search. This perspective requires that 
some members leave, but the role of exit should diminish with experience. 
Retention decisions should be explicable using the experiential search framework. To test 
this, four nested models, similar to those previously discussed, are operationalized: (I) the Olsonian 
model in which divisible benefits are assumed to exceed costs; (II) the same model with 
organizational experience incorporated; (III) this second specification with collective benefits added; 
and (IV) a complete formulation that also takes into account purposive and solidary returns. 
Estimation of these models permits the determination of both whether organizational search is 
involved and what specific factors drive Common Cause participants to retain or revoke their 
membership. 
Measurement 
The likelihood of membership retention in the next contribution period-the dependent 
variable-is operationalized using a seven-point scale. Scores range from one, for those certain to 
quit, to seven, for those certain to remain. Roughly consistent with Common Cause's 78 percent 
renewal rate, 54 percent of all members queried responded that they were certain to renew (it should 
be remembered that the sample is weighted toward activists; only 49 percent of the rank-and-file 
expressed certainty that they would stay). The other 46 percent expressed different levels of 
uncertainty (scored from six to one): 26 percent called renewal very likely, 12 percent said it was 
likely, 3 percent suggested that they were not sure, and another 6 percent claimed that they were not 
very likely to, were unlikely to, or definitely would not renew their membership. Half of the 
organization was up for grabs to one degree or another, and a nontrivial minority was relatively 
certain of leaving Common Cause. 
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The factors posited to structure this choice are operationalized in the following manner: 
( 1) Costs of membership are measured as the ability to pay (family income) and the respondent's 
sensitivity to costs.21
(2) The relevance of three divisible benefits are incorporated: (a) the importance of publications 
and whether contributions would cease without them; (b) the perceived value of political 
information; and (c) whether or not a member has political aspirations.22
(3) The lure of collective benefits is gauged by whether (a) individuals agree with the positions of 
Common Cause on key issues; (b) they consider the leadership effective in providing collective 
goods; (c) they are active in the group; and (d) they believe that they are efficacious in the 
production of collective goods.23
(4) Learning is measured by organizational experience, operationalized to capture the hypothesis of 
diminishing marginal returns with both a logarithmic and a linear term of the number of years 
in the organization. 
(5) Purposive benefits are tapped by whether respondents feel an obligation as good citizens to 
participate and whether they care about the group.24
(6) Solidary benefits are measured by whether the members value the interpersonal interactions 
Common Cause provides and a dummy variable on whether they have friends and colleagues 
within the organization. 25 
Given these indicators, many expectations are straightforward. Still others are not as clear as 
they might seem and will be contingent on how well Common Cause provides benefits, e.g., the 
degree to which the organization satisfies members who want to promote their political careers or 
find rewarding interpersonal relationships. One clear, important expectation is that the sign for years 
in the organization (linear form) should be negative, while that for the logged version ought to be 
positive; this would reflect the diminishing marginal impact of learning through organizational 
experience. 
Results and Interpretations 
The ordinary least squares estimates (Table 4) show that the retention decision is 
explicable. 26 Even when the focus of analysis is current members-a homogenous, truncated sample
of society-it is possible to separate out those prone to stay from those likely to leave. Such results 
are inconsistent with the informational assumptions underlying previous formulations of the joining 
process. 
(Table 4 about here) 
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A framework incorporating various kinds of returns and learning does a superior job to more 
limited alternatives. Looking at divisible benefits generated via selective incentives is not enough; 
collective, solidary, and purposive benefits, as well as organizational learning, also affect the 
decision calculus. 
The whole gamut of costs and benefits go into the retention decision. 27 The price of
membership is an important consideration, although ability to pay per se is not. While all members 
know the monetary cost of joining, some are especially sensitive to it. Those finding that 
membership is not worth the opportunity cos�f foregoing participation in another organization, 
for instance-depart and either search elsewhere or become inactive. 
The salience of divisible benefits is more nebulous. When the Olsonian model is 
operationalized the group's publications, the political information it provides, and the opportunities 
it furnishes to political aspirants all appear important. When other benefits are fully integrated into 
the decision framework, however, everything but the value of Common Cause publications is 
insignificant, and even the estimate of its impact is halved. 
The utility of the Olsonian framework as a predictive model for retention decisions in public 
interest groups is questionable; as an explanatory framework, it is even less successful. This is not a 
direct indictment of a perspective designed to explain initial joining in economic groups. However, 
it does provide some reason to doubt the assumptions underlying this decision-making model. 
The effect of political aspirations, although insignificant in the final model (t = 1.3), is 
nevertheless intriguing. These individuals are less likely to remain in Common Cause than other 
contributors. Once they learn about the true nature of the organization--its antagonistic stance 
toward political parties, for example-they may decide that Common Cause is the wrong place for 
them and move on. Even if the politically ambitious are more likely than others to join the 
association (and given the percentage of members who have such motivations, this is probably the 
case), they can still be more prone to quitting. Conversely, the relationship between future 
aspirations and retention will be positive in organizations that are good mechanisms for building 
political careers. 
Collective benefits appear to be an important element in the conditional joining calculus. 
Despite the fact that few members cited such returns as the principal reason for initially joining, they 
seem to be the most relevant factor for the retention choice.28 Leadership assessments, level of
activism, and efficacy all have an impact. So too do agreements with Common Cause issue 
positions. Of particular salience are those good government issues-sunset legislation, campaign 
finance, and regulation of lobbyists-in which the organization has traditionally been involved. 29
One explanation for this tension between the apparent insignificance of collective benefits in 
joining decisions and their critical role for retention calculi centers on experiential search. Many 
people are ignorant about the organization when they first sign on but gradually learn upon joining. 
All they might know is that Common Cause is a group that deals with good government issues and 
for which experiential search comes cheaply. After contributing, they discover more specifically 
what the organization does and how much it accomplishes. These data are employed in calculating 
whether or not to stay in the group. There is a move away from being concerned about purposive 
benefits toward an interest in more specific collective returns. 
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But do contributors really switch their motivations from purposive to collective benefits? 
More likely, this distinction between purposive and personal returns is exaggerated by measurement 
error confounding individual and group rewards. Put another way, what is being interpreted as 
collective benefits may really be specific statements about purposive returns (Hardin 1982). 
Contributors ' responses may reflect their perceptions of the group's, and not their personal, impact 
on the provision of collective benefits. Their assessment of the group's leadership and policies is 
important for deciding whether to exit because they think the organization has an impact on the 
production of public goods. They learn about the group's efficacy and how their policy predilections 
correspond to the organization's and either stay or depart accordingly. Learning integrates initial 
and conditional membership: Broad motivations are replaced by more specific ones. 
Explicitly purposive benefits are still germane. Common Cause is a good place for people 
who really care about such returns and want to be good citizens. Some members develop an 
attachment to the group and find their participation satisfying regardless of the divisible goods they 
may receive or how effectively the organization meets their personal policy goals. Consequently, 
contributors who have an abiding interest in being good citizens or who develop a strong 
identification with Common Cause tend to keep on giving. 
To summarize: These findings about collective and purposive rewards support the 
proposition that members go from general to specific reasons for staying or leaving as they become 
more knowledgeable. This explanation is consistent with the side-evidence about learning. All that 
is additionally required is the assumption that individuals recognize their informational shortfalls 
before joining and employ experiential search to remedy them partially. This strategy leads 
members to offer vaguely purposive reasons for initially joining and more specific concerns about 
collective goods for staying or leaving. 
Similarly, solidary benefits are rarely mentioned as a major reason for joining. Yet they too 
are significant factors in the retention choice. For those seeking such interactions, the organization 
delivers the goods. Others may discover that a by-product of searching over purposive and 
collective benefits is a rewarding associational involvement. Again, the tension between initial and 
subsequent conditional membership choices stems from the fact that contributors learn over time. 
Those who find rewarding interpersonal relationships stay in Common Cause; those who either do 
not care about such interactions or decide that the organization does not provide the solidary benefits 
they desire, depart. 
The findings regarding learning offer a second test of the experiential search theory and, 
once again, provide validation. Specifically, they lend credence to the hypothesis that experiential 
learning yields diminishing marginal returns. Each year has a positive, yet declining, impact on the 
probability that members will remain committed even after all the standard costs and benefits of 
joining are incorporated into the model. Ceteris paribus, a newcomer scores three-quarters of a 
point lower on the seven-point scale than the most veteran contributors. In other words, there is 
considerable vacillation among new members about their future intentions, but this uncertainty 
dissipates over time. By and large, departing contributors are recent converts who, upon learning 
about the group, become disenchanted; they are not long-term members who grow bored with 
Common Cause. 
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Similarly, the overall predictions from the full experiential search model (Model IV) lend 
credence to the hypothesis that the probability of staying increases temporally but at a diminishing 
rate (Figure 2). The impact of the early years is roughly five times greater than the effect of the later 
years; and, as discussed previously, there are no obvious differences between long-term members 
and newcomers that might render this relationship artifactual. The only possible inference is that 
individuals learn and update their information; those liking what they see stay, and the rest search 
elsewhere. This conclusion is consistent with Common Cause's own troubles in holding onto new 
members-for example, only about 55 percent of first-year members continue to contribute the 
following year, while roughly 90 percent of long-time members remain. 
(Figure 2 about here) 
Finally, consider what happens when the sample is split between newcomers-those 
contributing for six years or less-and veterans, and a revised version of Model IV is estimated 
(Table 5). 30 Most strikingly, but predictably from an experiential search perspective, the model does
a superior job of explaining why newcomers come and go as compared to veterans. Longer-term 
members more closely approximate the full information ideal and are prone to depart for 
idiosyncratic reasons. Also as predicted, specific characteristics loom larger in newcomers' retention 
decisions. 
(Table 5 about here) 
While there is no appreciable difference between the two samples in the findings for 
purposive benefits (no coefficient is significant), there are variations in the effects of solidary benefits 
and especially collective returns. In all but one instance (efficacy) where there is a significant 
relationship, the impact of these factors is stronger for newcomers than for veterans. Not only is 
learning about specific characteristics crucial, it is especially salient for those who are new to the 
organization. 31
All three tests of the experiential search perspective support its validity as a superior 
framework for conceptualizing the retention choice. Members make their decisions in a systematic, 
comprehensible fashion. The decision to remain in the organization reflects their discovery that the 
group provides the benefits for which they are searching. Learning is an important component in 
understanding how conditional membership choices are made. Overall predictions about the 
probability of remaining in the organization reflect the diminishing marginal returns to be expected 
if individuals garner information through experiential search. An individual's first years in the 
organization are especially important-particularly for learning about highly specific characteristics. 
15 
Conclusions: Experiential Search and the Retention Choice 
Understanding why people leave or remain in groups has received little attention. The 
retention decision should not be taken as a given, i.e., something that is determined by the initial 
choice to contribute. The conditional membership decision is fundamental for organizational 
stability and is a constant source of anxiety for group leaders. It reflects a experiential search process 
through which contributors acquire information and make increasingly knowledgeable choices. 
This perspective is very different from that adopted by previous analysts of organizational 
membership. Here it is assumed that imperfectly informed decision-makers are aware of their 
shortfalls and take them into account in making choices. Because accruing information is costly, 
there is an incentive to become informed in the most efficient way possible. If the price of 
membership is small and a mistake is easily rectified at the next contribution period, joining a group 
and learning about it experientially may well be the optimal strategy. 
Common Cause members behave very much in this manner. The following picture of the 
average contributor emerges from this analysis: Individuals join an organization about which they 
are largely uninformed. They have a rough idea about what it stands for, but they lack the detailed 
knowledge needed to decide whether this is the best association for them. They are as informed 
about politics, as educated, and as wealthy as long-time members; but they lack organization-specific 
information, which is best gained experientially. 
Consequently, the retention process is explicable by specifying a model that reflects 
information updating. Among other things, the findings make clear that early on, when the 
incremental informational gains are greatest, there is a high probability that revising prior beliefs 
will precipitate departures. As time progresses and the additional impact of another period 
diminishes, so too does the probability of dropping out. The accrual of knowledge about the 
organization also leads members to rely upon more specific criteria in making their conditional 
membership decisions than they claim motivated their initial contributions. Examining the model's 
overall predictions about future membership behavior simply buttresses the experiential search story 
further. So too does the contrast between what the model reveals about newcomers and about 
veterans. 
Group participation ought to be conceptualized as a experiential search process in which 
individuals with only imperfect information are forced to make choices. They may commit 
calculated mistakes, but they will eventually rectify them. This framework makes organizational 
quitting understandable and provides a linkage between the initial membership choice and follow-up 
decisions. It furnishes insights into how the ebb and flow of group membership ought to vary 
systematically across associations, depending upon both the costs of contributing and the variety of 
benefits available to association members. Any number of interesting comparisons for testing this 
general perspective spring to mind: for example, contrasting an organization like Common Cause, 
which conducts much of its business through the mail and over the telephone, and one like the 
League of Women Voters, for which interpersonal interactions that provide solidary rewards are 
more central. 
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The empirical findings suggest that group leaders ought to weigh newer members' 
preferences more heavily than those of long-time contributors-assuming that both are equally 
valued. They also imply that any educational efforts made by the leadership should be centered on 
appealing to these newcomers; utilizing scarce resources to sway veteran participants is likely to be a 
bad investment. 
What is needed in the future is the collection of data better designed to capture the dynamics 
of retention choices. Without a doubt, the key flaw of the present research is that only limited 
temporal data are available. Future endeavors must employ longitudinal designs, including studies 
that follow up on individuals who begin, continue, and cease contributing (and perhaps go 
elsewhere); analyses that explicitly build in samples of the general public as well as group members; 
and research that incorporates a multiplicity of groups varying on those dimensions that should 
affect the amount of experiential search undertaken. Such data will provide a better, more integrated 
understanding of why people join and either stay in or leave organizations than the initial attempt 
made in this analysis. 
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TABLE 1: MEMBERS' PROCLAIMED REASONS FOR JOINING
Reason for Joining N % 
Purposive Benefits 
Supports Common Cause 's General Goals, Issues, or Efforts 169 14.7 
Keep Government Honest and Fair 162 14.1 
Reform, Improve Government; Make 132 11.5 
Government More Responsive 
Combat Special Interests, Lobbyists, 79 6.9 
PACs, Corporations, Big Business 
Support for Public Interest/Common Good 71 6.2 
Support Watchdog/Investigatory Group 53 4.6 
Nonpartisan Group 26 2.3 
Protest Political Power/Corruption 21 1.8 
General Support-No Issue Content 20 1.7 
Worried about Democracy 18 1.6 
Anti Government or Political Parties 17 1.5 
Civic Duty 13 1.1 
Problems in Society, Government Policies 11 1.0 
Maintain Checks and Balances 10 0.9 
Group Unique/Important 9 0.8 
Lend Financial Support 8 0.7 
Liberal/Anticonservative Group 6 0.5 
SUBTOTAL 825 71.9 
Selective Benefits (Collective or Divisible) 
Makes Member Effective 65 5.7 
Political Information 53 4.6 
Specific Issue(s) 35 3.0 
Chance for Personal Political Activity 32 2.8 
Collective Action Necessary for Change 28 2.4 
Leadership 26 2.3 
Common Cause Provides Representation 18 1.6 
Common Cause Informs Citizens/ 12 1.0 
Encourages Participatory Democracy 
Chance to be Mobilized on Issues 11 1.0 
Group Is Effective 9 0.8 
Activist Organization 5 0.4 
SUBTOTAL 294 25.6 
Solidary Benefits 
Family, Friends Belong 11 1.0 
Joining Part of Life Style/Social Reasons 3 0.3 
SUBTOTAL 14 1.3 
Miscellaneous 16 1.4 
TOTAL 1149 100.2 
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TABLE 2: ORGANIZATIONAL EXPERIENCE AND KNOWLEDGE ABOUT GROUP
Years Percentage Correct Mean 
in Percentage 
Group 0 25 50 75 100 Correct 
1 34. 1 31.7 26.8 4.9 2.4 27.5 
2 34.9 23.3 30.2 8 .1  3.5 30.5 
3 20.4 18.4 28.6 25.5 7. 1 45.2 
4 9 .6 19.3 22.9 42.2 6.0 53.9 
5 7.3 15.9 35.4 30.5 1 1.0 55.5 
6 12. 1 13.6 28.8 30.3 15.2 55.7 
7 5.4 14.7 28.7 3 1.0 20.2 61.4 
8 2.5 13.6 25.9 42.0 16.0 63.9 
9 4.9 10.7 29. 1 32.0 23.3 64.6 
10 3.4 1 1.2 16.9 47.2 21.3 70.0 
1 1  2.8 8.4 25.2 28 .0 35.5 71.3 
12 5.3 5.3 23.7 39.5 26.3 69. 1
N 1 16 159 307 368 205 1115 
x2 = 254, d.f. = 44 
Note: Each cell gives the percentage of members who have been in the group for x years (row) who get the 
designated percentage (column) of the answers correct. 
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TABLE 3a: ORGANIZATIONAL EXPERIENCE AND GROUP ISSUE OPINIONS 
(Percentage of Common Cause Members without Opinions) 
Organizational Experience (Years in Group) 
Issue 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 1  12 Tot% N xz
Limit Government Spending 58 38 37 31 40 37 33 39 5 1  45 51  43 4 1  1 155 22* 
'Sunset' Legislation 40 23 20 21 11 13 9 1 1  6 8 14 10 14 1 164 54** 
Campaign Finance 24 24 1 1  10 6 7 5 1 2 1 7 3 7 1 167 74** 
Equal Rights Amendment 28 30 26 19 24 19 13 18 17 12 15 13 18 1 162 25** 
Lobby Disclosure 20 20 14 8 5 9 5 1 3 1 11  4 7 1 174 56** 
TABLE 3b: ORGANIZATIONAL EXPERIENCE AND PERSONAL ISSUE OPINIONS
(Percentage of Common Cause Members without Opinions) 
Issue 
Limit Government Spending 
'Sunset' Legislation 
Campaign Finance 
Equal Rights Amendment 
Lobby Disclosure 
Defense Spending 
Equality of Opportunity 
Social Service Spending 
Inflation 
Abortion 
Minimum Guaranteed Income 
School Busing 
Nuclear Energy 
Soviet Relations 
**p < .01 *p < .05
Organizational Experience (Years in Group) 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 1  
5 8 7 7 6 9 3 2 8 5 3 
2 3 9 2 1 6 2 1 1 3 1 
2 1 6 6 2 4 2 1 0 1 2 
0 3 6 1 1 1 1 2 2 1 2 
0 1 2 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
10 10 4 11  12 9 6 3 5 5 5 
3 16 19 12 17 6 18 10 17 17 19 
5 1 1  6 10 1 14 6 6 10 8 8 
13 22 16 22 20 18 1 1  16 21  21  24 
10 1 7 5 2 4 2 4 2 1 3 
13 8 16 14 17 14 12 18 16 16 20 
8 15 10 14 1 1  6 15 15 16 17 20 
8 10 10 14 20 11  15 11  13 1 1  8 
33 39 25 20 32 34 32 27 29 31  29 
12 Tot% N xz
6 6 1 173 9 
3 3 1 183 21  * 
4 3 1 181  15 
2 2 1 182 13 
1 1 1 186 11  
10 7 1 180 15 
12 15 1 179 18 
8 8 1 167 13 
19 19 1 167 11  
3 3 1 178 16 
17 15 1 172 7 
13 14 1176 12 
17 13 1 180 13 
30 30 1 180 10 
20 
TABLE 4: DETERMINANTS OF RETENTION DECISIONS 
Variable Model I Model II Model III Model IV 
Constant 6.2534** 5.3809**  2.5474** 0.6106** 
Costs 
Ability to Pay 0.0049 -0.0056 0.0261 0.0276 
Low Sensitivity to Costs 1. 1073** 1.0371 ** 0.8262** 0.7768** 
Moderate Sensitivity to Costs 0.5 112** 0.5163** 0.4526** 0.4159** 
Divisible Benefits 
Value of Political Information 0.0066* 0.0059 0.0067 0.0287 
Publications ' Value 0.1495** 0. 1492** 0.0908** 0.0754** 
Low Sensitivity to 0.2885**  0. 1990** 0. 1242 0.0751 
Provision of Publications 
Moderate Sensitivity to 0.2431 **  0.2096** 0. 1173 0.0567 
Provision of Publications 
Political Aspirant -0. 1495**  -0. 1898**  -0. 1799**  -0. 1083 
Learning 
Organizational Experience -0.0263 -0.0193 -0.0188 
Ln Organizational Experience 0.5994** 0.3789** 0.3845** 
Collective Benefits 
Agreement with Group's  0.0115** 0.0110** 
Positions 
Assessment of 0.3024** 0.2669** 
Leadership's Achievements 
Active in Group 0.0758** 0. 1043**
Feel Personally 0.0509** 0.0511  ** 
Efficacious re: Group 
Purposive Benefits 
Care about Group 0.0385** 
Citizen Duty 0.0708** 
Solidary Benefits 
Value Interaction 0. 1147**
Friends/Colleagues Members 0.0971** 
Number of Cases 1 1 14 1085 986 930 
R -Squared . 18 1  .229 .346 .368 
**p < .05 *p < . 10
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TABLE 5: RETENTION DECISIONS OF SHORTER AND LONGER TERM MEMBERS
Variable Newcomers Veterans 
Constant -0.2330 2.0580** 
Costs 
Ability to Pay 0.0439 0.0143 
Low Sensitivity to Costs 1 . 1 150** 0.5553** 
Moderate Sensitivity to Costs 0.583 1 ** 0.2335** 
Divisible Benefits 
Value of Political Information -0.0053 0.0580 
Publications' Value 0. 1 186* 0.0685* 
Low Sensitivity to Provision of Publications 0.2900* 0. 1024
Moderate Sensitivity to Provision of Publications 0.0937 -0.0323 
Political Aspirant -0. 1 876 -0.0983 
Learning 
Organizational Experience 0. 1010** 0.0384* 
Collective Benefits 
Agreement with Group's  Positions 0.0125** 0.0095** 
Assessment of Leadership's Achievements 0.28 12** 0.2348** 
Active in Group 0. 1548** 0.0824** 
Feel Personally Efficacious re: Group 0.0224 0.0550* 
Purposive Benefits 
Care about Group 0.0458 0.0345 
Citizen Duty 0. 1029 0.0373 
Solidary Benefits 
Value Interaction -0.0431 0. 1263
Friends/Colleagues Members 0. 1984** 0.0590 
Number of Cases 370 560 
R -Squared .426 .265 
**p < .05 *p < . 1 0
t = 1 
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FIGURE I: ORGANIZATIONAL MEMBERSHIP AS EXPERIENTIAL SEARCH 
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Notes 
* The assistance of Bruce Cain, Jeff Dubin, Tom Gilligan, Jonathan Nagler, Barbara Rothenberg, 
and Jack Wright is appreciated. All blame remains with the author. 
1 .  Building a core membership is  extremely important for ensuring long-term organizational 
survival. Even those associations that receive foundation grants and support from other 
organizations may find that these sources of wealth are unreliable. 
2. In her study of four Michigan groups, Cook (1984) does provide some data on whether member
satisfaction/dissatisfaction is associated with intentions to remain in the organization. Moe
(1980) also touches on the decision to exit in his empirical work.
In an intriguing theoretical piece, Johnson (1987) demonstrates that if a median voter rule 
were employed in determining dues levels (contributors constitute the electorate), voluntary 
associations would inevitably collapse due to exit He also correctly notes, however, that group 
leaders can thwart this potential instability. At Common Cause, for examples, dues are set by 
those running the organization. 
3. Retention is the term utilized in studies of reenlistment decisions by military personnel (e.g. ,
Gotz & McCall 1983, 1984).
4. This is a generic problem that all organizational leaders face. Employers, for instance, also deal
with the problem of holding onto valuable workers, as well as attracting capable replacements.
What sharply distinguishes interest groups from other organizations is that nonparticipation in
the public arena is a far more viable alternative.
5. The data utilized here were collected under NSF grant SES-8105708. Many thanks go to the
investigator, Jonathon Siegel, for generously sharing these data. Because this is a stratified
sample, the descriptive information is frequently broken down between rank-and-file members
and activists; but the sample design has no impact on the hypotheses tests conducted.
6. Not all of the alternative specifications are examined here. For example, Smith (1985) develops
a model of contributions to environmental organizations based on the theory of club goods.
However, none of the public goods that Common Cause might provide (or few other groups
either) have an element of excludability to them, which is essential for translating the economic
theory of clubs into one of group membership.
Similarly, Hansen (1985) furnishes a context-dependent model of membership decisions 
based on prospect theory. Incorporating his insights would require a complete panel design. 
7. Moe takes the imperfect information assumption somewhat further, but almost strictly from the 
perspective of group leaders (particularly how to structure an organization to encourage 
donations), rather than from the contributors' viewpoint. 
8. Experiential search can be distinguished from the economics literature on sequential search (for
an excellent recent overview, see Mortensen 1984) . In the latter, individuals typically search
sequentially until they meet their reservation wage or price, where the expected marginal cost of
an additional iteration equals the expected marginal return. In these models, workers or
consumers gather information before taking a job or purchasing a product.
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There are some models (e.g., Burdett 1978, Wilde 1979) that permit on-the-job or 
experiential learning by workers within a sequential search framework. These perspectives are 
much closer in spirit to the experiential search theory propounded here. There are still 
important differences, however, between these models and the framework developed in this 
analysis. For example, by and large, workers must search for a job, while there is no similar 
compulsion to join a public interest group. 
9. An interesting implication is that fewer members will learn experientially in private groups with
expensive membership charges. Instead, decision-makers will use their resources to search
from outside of the organization. Membership in interest groups with relatively large dues
should therefore be less volatile than in comparatively "cheap" organizations.
10. A quintessential example of exogenous forces is found in Wilson's (1962) observation that 
"amateur Democrats" lose their enthusiasm to spend endless hours working' for the cause once 
an election is over. 
1 1 . As will be discussed in more detail, the ideal means of studying membership would be through 
a panel study. The analysis presented here is a second-best alternative. 
12. Respondents were asked whether their present family income was (in dollars): (1) under
10,000; (2) 10,000-20,000; (3) 20,000-25,000; (4) 25,000-35,000; (5) 35,000-50,000; (6)
50,000-75,000; (7) 75,000-100,000; (8) over 100,000.
1 3 .  Seventy-three percent of those contacted actually wrote: 6 0  percent of the rank-and-file and 90 
percent of all activists. Further corroboration of the mobilization of the membership is given by 
the finding that 44 percent of those sampled (35 percent of the rank-and-file members contacted 
and 78 percent of the activists) reported writing in the previous year about at least one of the 
following six issues: a constitutional amendment limiting government spending, sunset laws, 
campaign finance, reapportionment, lobby disclosure, or the Equal Rights Amendment (ERA). 
14. An overwhelming 98.5 percent of those queried reported reading the Common Cause 
publications they receive. 
15. The 31 reasons for joining listed in Table 1 were coded from 99 different answers. Only those
citing specific issue(s), leadership, nonpartisan group, or unique/important were subsequently
difficult to classify into the four broad categories; and they accounted for about eight percent of
the respondents.
16. Empirically there should be (and is) a positive relationship between knowledge-and 
organizational experience generally-and the decision to stay in the group. Those who gain 
information and do not like what they learn, drop out. 
17. A strong caveat is in order: Cross-sectional evidence is being used to draw temporal
conclusions. It is nevertheless hard to tell a compelling story about how employing this cross­
sectional information would confound this part of the analysis. Thus, it is worthwhile to try to 
uncover evidence of contributor learning with these data, especially because they are probably
the best currently available.
1 8. The four statements [and their answers], to which members could reply true, false, or don't 
know are (1) Members of Common Cause elect the governing board [true]; (2) Members of 
Common Cause elect the Common Cause chairman [false]; (3) Common Cause is a federation 
of state and local organizations [false]; and (4) Common Cause state organizations determine 
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their own issue agendas [true] . 
A further check was perfonned to make sure that the relationship between knowledge and 
tenure is not a spurious reflection of the fact that activists have been in the group longer. The 
data show that even after controlling for whether respondents were activists or rank-and-file 
members, the association remains quite strong, although activism also is related to 
organizational knowledge. 
19. The one exception dealt with constitutional amendments limiting government spending. This
issue was relatively new on the Common Cause agenda, and long-time members themselves
might not have had time to learn about it. More than 40 percent of the entire membership had
no opinion on Common Cause's position on it, as compared to a maximum of 1 8  percent on the 
other four items.
20. Rather than being asked how many years they have been activists, these members were
requested to choose one of five categories: (1) 8-10 years, (2) 6-7 years, (3) 4-5 years, (4) 2-3
years, and (5) 1 year or less. The three-year estimate is conservative; it is based on the most
years possible-10, 7, 5, 3, or 1-that participants might have been involved relative to the
number of years they had been in the group. If the means of the above categories were
substituted for the upper bounds, modal activists would be in their fourth year.
2 1 .  As mentioned, family income i s  tapped with an eight-fold variable. Cost sensitivity i s  gauged 
with two dummy variables coded from a question in which members were asked if they would 
remain in the organization (yes, can't say, no) if Common Cause raised its annual dues from 20 
dollars to 40 dollars. 
22. Members were asked two five-fold questions about the importance to them personally of (a) 
magazines and other Common Cause publications and (b) the political infonnation the 
association provided. They were also given a question parallel to the one on cost sensitivity in
which they were queried whether they would stop contributing if the publications were halted.
23. Position agreement is measured as -1 [ � (X;p - X;c )2] where X;p and Xie are, respectively,
1=1 
contributors' personal preferences and views of where Common Cause stands on the following 
issues: an amendment limiting government spending, sunset legislation, campaign finance 
laws, the ERA, and lobby disclosure laws. Of course, only those respondents with personal 
preferences and estimates of Common Cause positions are included; those contributors without 
issue opinions (see Tables 3a and 3b) are excluded. 
Leadership assessment1s an additive index combining five-fold responses to questions 
about the legislative success of Common Cause and an explicit rating of how well the 
leadership and staff do their jobs. Activity is tapped by counting whether a person has (a) 
written or talked to Common Cause staff or leaders about a group policy or position; (b) 
attempted to attract new contributors; (c) attended a local Common Cause meeting in the last 
year; (d) voted in the 1981 Governing Board Elections; or (e) completed the 1981 Membership 
Poll. Finally, the personal efficacy measure combines the responses to two parallel questions 
on how important to the success of Common Cause individuals think (a) their own 
contributions and (b) their own political activities are. 
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24. The fonner is an additive index of the importance assigned to membership in Common Cause
as a means of fulfilling the responsibilities of citizenship, supporting leaders like John Gardner
and Archibald Cox, and helping to ensure good government. Caring is an additive scale of
member interest in each of the five issues used to construct the position agreement scale.
25. The fonner is a five-fold response to a question on the importance contributors attribute to
meeting interesting people and making new friends.
26. Before estimating these findings, a number of preliminary steps were taken. To ensure that it is
acceptable to pool the activists designated by Common Cause with rank-and-file members, a
Chow test (Chow 1960) was conducted. The results of the test proved to be insignificant, thus
pennitting the pooling. Also, Hausman tests (Hausman 1978) were utilized to ascertain
whether either organizational experience or issue distance was endogenously detennined:
Neither was.
Additional tests were undertaken to ascertain whether the standard seven-fold specification 
of the dependent variable is correct. A Hausman test for detennining if the slopes for a seven­
ordered probit are identical to those for a three-fold analogue (no, can't say, yes) led to the 
rejection of the null hypothesis that B7 = B3 (X2 = 35, d.f. = 19).  This finding implies that the 
seven-category operationalization is subject to specification error of some sort, although the 
ramifications are uncertain. 
This discovery precipitated a further investigation to uncover whether a better specification 
is available. The obvious alternative is a two-stage conditional structure that breaks the 
retention decision first into a direction (no, can't say, yes) and then into a strength (certain, very 
likely, likely) choice. When the log-likelihood ratios of the conditional and unconditional 
processes are compared (see Vuong 1986), however, the latter model is far superior. Given this 
strong finding, the unconditional, seven-fold specification was adopted with the caveat that 
there may be some superior alternative. 
Having decided upon this specification, both ordinary least squares (OLS) and probit 
estimation were then employed. The results are identical for all intents and purposes; the OLS 
results are reported here due to their ease of interpretation. 
One final note regarding estimation: Attrition should not have had an impact on the 
estimates in Table 4.  As long as quitting is related to exogenous factors-unhappiness with the 
group, evaluations of the leadership, etc.-and these factors are controlled for, the ensuing 
estimates are unbiased (Hausman & Wise 1979). 
27. Unfortunately, no good measure of nonpecuniary costs was available for the whole sample. An 
indicator that worked for part of it (N = 395) was whether or not Common c;ause members
responded to attempts to mobilize them. Even after controlling for all other factors, these costs 
are important detenninants of the retention decision. This result provides evidence that those 
who find these additional organizational demands taxing depart, presumably either to find an 
association where they can be check writers or to leave the world of organizational participation 
completely. 
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28. An increase of one standard deviation in a member's score on each of the collective benefit
indicators would result in a jump of .71 on the retention scale. This change is slightly greater
than the impact of membership costs (.63), followed by divisible benefits (.23), purposive
returns (.21), organizational experience (. 1 8), and solidary rewards (. 17).
The strength of membership costs might be a bit of a surprise. However, the measures of 
cost sensitivity-the willingness to quit in response to a 20 dollar increase in dues-are also 
tapping estimates of the value of benefits. 
29. These findings are based on a regression using the Model IV specification, with the sums of the 
squared differences for each issue being substituted separately instead of cumulatively. The 
two relatively new issues on the Common Cause agenda-ERA and placing limits on 
government spending-are not relevant. These latter concerns represent a departure from the 
issues for which the organization gained its reputation and apparently have not become a prime
reason for remaining in the organization (nor for joining probably).
30. The logarithmic term for learning is now unnecessary, since the sample was split according to 
how many years a contributor was in the group. 
The definitive means of testing whether coefficients vary between newcomers and veterans 
is to employ interaction terms with the full sample. However, multicollinearity makes such 
estimates unfeasible in this instance. 
3 1 .  The larger impact of cost sensitivity on newcomers than veterans probably reflects the fonner's 
greater uncertainty about the value of membership. 
29 
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